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In Freedom's Law, Ronald Dworkin propounds his theory of consti-
tutional interpretation and applies it to some of the most controversial 
constitutional issues of the last twenty years, including abortion, affirma-
tive action, pornography, hate speech, gay rights, euthanasia, and free 
speech. Although each of the chapters of the book was first published as 
a separate essay, together they provide an engaging and coherent account 
of Dworkin's constitutional philosophy. 
In the first part of the book, Dworkin elaborates and argues for what 
he calls the moral reading of the Constitution. The United States Consti-
tution, like most contemporary constitutions, defines individual rights in 
very broad and abstract language. The Fourth Amendment, for example, 
protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures." The Eighth Amend-
ment protects against "cruel and unusual" punishment. According to the 
moral reading, clauses that incorporate such terms should be construed as 
referring to "abstract moral principles and las] incorporatling] these by 
reference, as limits on government's power." (p. 7). 
The moral reading of the Constitution, on Dworkin's view, implies 
that "government must treat all those subject to its dominion as having 
equal moral and political status; it must attempt, in good faith, to treat 
them all with equal concern; and it must respect whatever individual free-
doms are indispensable to those ends, including but not limited to the 
freedoms more specifically designated in the document, such as the free-
doms of speech and religion." (p. 8). Since constitutional rights are not 
limited to those specifically mentioned in the Constitution, constitutional 
interpretation requires the sort of analysis that is common to applied moral 
philosophy. On Dworkin's view, then, one cannot resolve a constitutional 
question about what equal protection requires without resolving the cor-
responding moral question of what the moral notion of equality requires. 
In this way, Dworkin's theory "brings political morality into the heart of 
constitutional law." (p.2) 
Unfortunately, Dworkin does not always apply these doctrines con-
sistently in addressing specific legal problems. For example, while the 
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moral reading implies that legislative history is of limited importance in 
interpreting the Constitution, he tends to assign dispositive weight to leg-
islative history when it points in the direction of the result he prefers. In 
considering the abortion question, Dworkin argues that "[t]he key ques-
tion in the debate over Roe v Wade is not a metaphysical question about 
whether a fetus has a soul, but a legal question, about the correct interpre-
tation of the Constitution!;] ••• [i]t is the question whether the fetus is a 
constitutional person." (p. 46). If the fetus is constitutional person, then it 
is protected by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which declares that no state may deny to any person equal protec-
tion of the laws. 
Given that Dworkin argues that the language in the Constitution 
should be construed as having moral content, one would expect him to 
resolve the issue of whether the fetus is a constitutional person by identi-
fying the moral principles that are incorporated by use of the term 'per-
son'. Thus, one would think that the issue of whether the fetus is a consti-
tutional person, according to the moral reading, turns on whether the fe-
tus is a moral person—and presumably this question would tum on pre-
cisely the sorts of metaphysical questions that Dworkin summarily re-
jects as being irrelevant. 
Instead, Dworkin relies on exactly the sort of historical analysis that 
he finds problematic in Bork's doctrine of original understanding: 
The best historical evidence shows, moreover, that even 
anti-abortion laws, which were not prevalent in the 
United States before the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury, were adopted to protect the health of the mother 
and the privileges of the medical profession, not out of 
any recognition of a fetus's rights. Even states that had 
the most stringent anti-abortion laws before Roe v. 
Wade, moreover, did not punish abortion as severely as 
murder, as they should have done if they thought a fe-
tus a constitutional person. Nor did they try to outlaw 
or penalize a woman's procuring an abortion in another 
state or abroad, (p. 49). 
Originalists, of course, typically reach a different conclusion on abortion: 
they argue that states are free to prohibit or permit abortion as they see fit 
because there is nothing in the Constitution that protects abortion. Never-
theless, Dworkin's reasoning here is exactly the sort of reasoning that 
originalism requires. If it were necessary to determine whether the fetus 
is a constitutional person, the originalist would look at the understanding 
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that the public had of the term 'person' at the time the relevant clause was 
ratified in order to identify its legal meaning. On the question of abortion, 
then, there is little difference between Dworkin's approach to legal inter-
pretation and that of the originalist. And it is this kind of unevenness that 
lends credence to the oft-repeated criticism that Dworkin's constitutional 
theory is result-driven in the sense that the point of his theory is to incor-
porate his liberal political views into the tenns of the Constitution. 
Of course, Dworkin would respond that it is not his view that history 
is irrelevant; indeed, Dworkin argues that "[t]he moral reading asks 
"judges] to find the best conception of constitutional moral principles ... 
that fits the broad story of America's historical record." (p. 11). Thus, 
Dworkin argues that history is relevant, but in a limited sense: "We turn 
to history to answer the question of what they intended to say, not the 
different question of what other intentions they had." (p. 10). 
But here Dworkin gets himself into exactly the same sort of trouble 
that plagues many originalists. Bork, for example, argues that Brown v. 
Board of Education was correctly decided, even though it is clear that, at 
the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, no one understood or 
intended that its terms would prohibit school segregation. Dworkin can't 
resist the temptation: 
The Court's decision [in Brown] was plainly required 
by the moral reading, because it is obvious now that 
official school segregation is not consistent with equal 
status and equal concern for all races. But the originalist 
strategy, consistently applied, would have demanded 
the opposite conclusion, because, as I said, the authors 
of the equal protection clause did not believe that school 
segregation, which they practiced themselves, was a 
denial of equal status, and did not expect that it would 
one day be deemed to be so. The moral reading insists 
that they misunderstood the moral principle that they 
themselves enacted into law. The originalist strategy 
would translate that mistake into enduring constitutional 
law. (p. 13). 
An anti-abortionist who endorses Dworkin's constitutional theory could 
make exactly the same criticism of Dworkin's analysis of abortion: it 
does not matter what legislatures enacted in the nineteenth century with 
respect to the question of abortion; for they misunderstood the moral prin-
ciple that was enacted into law by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, an 
anti-abortionist could argue that the moral reading, consistently applied, 
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requires that the Constitution be interpreted as giving protection to fe-
tuses. 
What Dworkin's theory needs, but does not provide, is some kind of 
principle or approach for determining when the history should be dis-
counted because it is mistaken. Without that account, his theory is vul-
nerable to the criticism that has been directed at all non-originalist ap-
proaches. Critics of such approaches commonly complain that they are 
inconsistent with democratic ideals inasmuch as they allow unelected 
judges to impose their subjective moral convictions on the public as law. 
While Dworkin rejects the idea that the moral reading allows judges to 
read their convictions into law, his analyses of Brown and Roe suggest 
that he has not,, fully appreciated the force of the criticism. The most 
interesting and controversial constitutional issues are difficult because 
they can be coherently decided in more than one way. Historical and po-
litical/moral considerations often pull in conflicting directions, making it 
possible for a judge to arrive at conflicting decisions. If the judge weighs 
the history more heavily than the conflicting political considerations, the 
decision goes one way; if she weighs the political considerations more 
heavily than the conflicting history, the decision goes the other way. 
Non-originalist approaches get into trouble because they do not provide 
any viable way of constraining the judge's decision as to how to weigh 
history and political morality relative to each other, which leaves the judge 
free to weigh them in accordance with her moral convictions with respect 
to how the case should turn out. As Dworkin's analysis of Brown and Roe 
indicates, the moral reading has the same sort of difficulties here as other 
forms of non-originalism. 
More successful is Dworkin's criticism of Borkean originalism. Bork 
rejects the idea that his originalist theory of constitutional interpretation 
implies that Brown was incorrectly decided. On Bork's view, the original 
intention that counts is not a set of particular opinions the framers might 
have had about whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits school seg-
regation. Rather it is a set of opinions about which general principle was 
promulgated by the Fourteenth Amendment. What the Fourteenth Amend-
ment ratified into law was a general principle about equality that, accord-
ing to Bork, is inconsistent with school segregation. Thus, Bork attempts 
to conclude from an originalist perspective that Brown was correctly de-
cided. 
But, as Dworkin points out, Bork's substantive analysis of Supreme 
Court decisions often relies on claims about particular opinions the framers 
had about concrete cases, rather than any general opinions they might 
have had about principles. For example, Bork endorses the Court's nar-
rowly historical analysis in Bowers v. Hardwick, in which the Court held 
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that the state could prohibit same-sex sexual acts. The Court reached its 
decision in Bowers principally on the strength of the claim that prohibi-
tions against same-sex sexual behavior were common at the time the rel-
evant constitutional provisions were ratified. But this kind of analysis 
makes sense only if it is the framers' particular opinions about concrete 
cases that count, and not opinions about matters of general principle. 
Accordingly, Dworkin argues that Bork is confronted with a dilemma: 
An appeal to the framers' intention ... decides nothing 
until some choice is made about the right way to for-
mulate that intention on any particular issue. If we 
choose the narrowest, most concrete formulation of 
original intention, which fixes on the discrete expressed 
opinions of the framers and ignores the more general 
moral vision they were trying to serve, then we must 
regard Brown as unfaithful to the framers' will; and the 
conclusion will seem to most people ample evidence 
that the most concrete formulation is the wrong one. If 
we assign to the framers a principle that is sufficiently 
general not to seem arbitrary and ad hoc, on the other 
hand, like the principle that government must not dis-
criminate on grounds of prejudice, then many of the 
decisions Bork castigates as illegitimate become proper 
according to the standards Bork himself claims to en-
dorse, (p. 271). 
But even in what is perhaps the most successful part of the book, 
Dworkin's criticism can be turned around and directed at the moral read-
ing; the argument would run as follows. An appeal to reconciling history 
and political morality decides nothing until some choice is made about 
the right way to weigh the competing claims of history and political mo-
rality. If we choose to assign more weight to history, then we must regard 
Brown as incorrectly decided; and the conclusion will seem to most people 
ample evidence that the choice of history as the more important value is 
the wrong one. If we choose to assign more weight to political morality, 
then many of the decisions that Dworkin accepts as legitimate, such as 
the Court's protection of abortion rights on the strength of historical con-
siderations, become open to question. It is indicative of the problems 
Dworkin's theory faces that they seem to dog him even in his successful 
criticisms of other theories. 
Nevertheless, there is much to be learned from the book. While 
Dworkin's theory, like every other theory of constitutional adjudication, 
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is vulnerable to serious criticisms, it represents an important contribution 
to philosophy of law—and one that deserves careful study by lawyers, 
judges and philosophers. His novel argument that Bork lacks a coherent 
constitutional theory is as entertaining as it is persuasive. As for particu-
lar issues of law, Dworkin's analysis is, as always, clear, forceful, and 
elegant. His penetrating analysis of the Supreme Court's treatment of is-
sues involving euthanasia, free speech, and academic freedom, as well as 
his spirited dialogue with Catharine MacKinnon on the question of por-
nography, make Freedom's Law an engaging and enlightening read. 
